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CONDITIONAL CASH TRANSFERS:

PROGRESS TOWARDS THE MILLENNIUM DEVELOPMENT GOALS
by Blase Kornacki*

T

he Millennium Development Goals (“MDGs”) set the
lofty targets of ensuring universal primary education,
reducing poverty, combating infectious diseases, and promoting gender equality.1 Commitment to similar goals in the past
has not met with much success; however, evolving approaches to
social welfare give hope that progress towards the MDGs is possible. One such new approach is the Latin American phenomenon
of conditional cash transfer programs (“CCTs”).
Conditional cash transfer programs are transforming Latin
America’s approach to social welfare.45 CCTs provide money
to families living in extreme poverty in exchange for the commitment to invest in human capital.46 The programs aim at
replacing the “traditional supply-side mechanisms” with
“demand-side interventions to directly support beneficiaries.”47 Traditional mechanisms battled poverty with subsidies
or direct investments in public goods, whereas the new
approach channels support directly to the people and promotes
investment in human capital, using market approaches as an
incentive to use social services such as primary and secondary
education and local health centers.48 Like the MDGs, the CCT
programs focus on the long-term benefits of improved education and health services rather than concentrating merely on
short-term income objectives. By providing financial incentives to induce school attendance, the programs aim to give
children the opportunity to contribute to the family without
having to enter the workforce.49
Brazil’s Bolsa Familia (“family fund”)50 is Latin
America’s largest CCT program, and is poised to become the
largest CCT program worldwide as well.51 Bolsa Familia, like
many similar programs across Latin America, combines the
educational element that requires 80-85 percent attendance with
additional health and nutrition requirements. It provides income
to 7.5 million of Brazil’s poorest families, in an effort to offset
the need for child-earned income by providing heads of households with a basic monthly payment.52 Because the administrators believe women are more likely to invest the money in their
children, payments are made every two months to female heads
of household.53 In return, recipients must ensure that their children are properly vaccinated and that they regularly attend
school. Children who do not meet the program’s school attendance requirements risk suspension of their families’ benefits.54
The programs have met with varying degrees of success.
Studies show that while recipients of the cash transfers are
more likely to attend school, they are not less likely to work.55
Instead, children are increasingly expected to juggle both work
and school.56 Attendance rates have been difficult to gauge,
and media allegations of extortion accuse teachers of withholding small grants from the very poor families in exchange
for proper reporting of attendance to the authorities.57 A further
critique of the programs is their emphasis on attendance rather
than the improvement of the quality of public education.58
While these critiques point out the inefficiencies of the new
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approach, CCT’s positive impacts are laying a foundation for
the future elimination of these shortcomings.
The statistics show a generally positive effect that CCTs
have had on their education goals, particularly in terms of
increased enrollment rates for both girls and boys.59
Nicaragua’s twenty-two percent increase in primary school
enrollment in CCT areas exhibits the most drastic improvement.60 Colombia has noted positive effects of CCTs on the
enrollment rates in rural areas, but there is no impact in the
urban zones.61 CCTs have also seen some success in narrowing
the gender gap in education.62 Targeting gender inequality,
some countries offer higher grants to females as an added
incentive to stay in school.63
The CCT’s positive impacts on school enrollment rates and
preventive healthcare attest to the overarching success of the
programs. Despite its criticisms, the CCTs’ innovative approach
to the delivery of social services gives hope that evolving welfare structures will facilitate the attainment of future targets such
as those set forth by the Millennium Development Goals.
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